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	<title>Comments on: What I might have learned at Melbourne Uni</title>
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		<title>By: Dave</title>
		<link>http://benhourigan.com/archives/2005/01/30/what-ive-learned-at-melbourne-uni/comment-page-1/#comment-10</link>
		<dc:creator>Dave</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2005 04:28:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benhourigan.com/?p=11#comment-10</guid>
		<description>Hehe, man I must have missed a lot of lectures, because I didn&#039;t learn any of that when I did my degree at Melbourne... then again, I was an Arts student, so it&#039;s not really my fault. 


I just couldn&#039;t stand al those pretentious students acting like they were better than everyone else. 

But that&#039;s just me.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hehe, man I must have missed a lot of lectures, because I didn&#8217;t learn any of that when I did my degree at Melbourne&#8230; then again, I was an Arts student, so it&#8217;s not really my fault.</p>
<p>I just couldn&#8217;t stand al those pretentious students acting like they were better than everyone else.</p>
<p>But that&#8217;s just me.</p>
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		<title>By: Ben Hourigan</title>
		<link>http://benhourigan.com/archives/2005/01/30/what-ive-learned-at-melbourne-uni/comment-page-1/#comment-8</link>
		<dc:creator>Ben Hourigan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Jan 2005 02:26:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benhourigan.com/?p=11#comment-8</guid>
		<description>I just realised I forgot to address the question of personal responsibility. The thing is, the science relating to free will is still incomplete. Daniel Dennett, probably the world&#039;s pre-eminent philosopher of mind, seems to think that free will is something that evolved, one of the things that gives humans their survival advantage over just about everything else on Earth. But on the other hand, our best guesses about how the mind works are that the mind is just what the brain does, and the brain is really just another biological machine, like everything else in our bodies, so its activities ought to be fully determined by physical factors: our immediately forthcoming thoughts and actions are just following on from the current physical state of our brain.

There are obviously issues to be resolved here. Now, I&#039;m not a philosopher of mind, but it strikes me that there is something in my experience that isn&#039;t adequately accounted for by a purely mechanistic theory of mind, as it stands, and that&#039;s intention. Although I form habits by doing things, because doing things strengthens the neural pathways that facilitate their doing, my intention to form a habit (by making sure I write some of my thesis every day, for instance) can be effective. That is to say, if I &lt;i&gt;choose&lt;/i&gt; to form a mental habit, I&#039;m more likely to form it than if I didn&#039;t bother with the discipline. Maybe this is all an illusionâ¦

But suppose I didn&#039;t &lt;i&gt;believe&lt;/i&gt; that it made any difference whether I intended to form a habit or not, that whether I finished my thesis or just slacked off until my scholarship ran out was already determined by the current state of my brain, which was in turn determined by my genetics, my upbringing, and so on. Then, if I was wrong, I would be likely just to leave everything up to my mechanistically determined destiny, and, failing to take action, I&#039;d probably just slack off until my scholarship ran out.

This, I believe, is the kind of effect it has to teach people that they aren&#039;t responsible for their actions. In short: they fail in life, and other people have to pick up the pieces of their shattered dreams. It&#039;s lucky that most of us are impervious to &quot;learning&quot; that we aren&#039;t responsible for what we do, and go on taking action regardless. Why do we do this? Because our experience tells us that it &lt;i&gt;does&lt;/i&gt; make a difference what we intend.

Sure, in the absence of true scientific knowledge about whether free will exists or not, we can go on arguing about it. But in the absence of such knowledge, I&#039;d say we ought to be pragmatic, and believe we are responsible for what we do. Because if we don&#039;t, and we leave things to mechanistic destiny, we relinquish our ability to control our lives and achieve our goals. And that, I don&#039;t need to tell you, would suck.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I just realised I forgot to address the question of personal responsibility. The thing is, the science relating to free will is still incomplete. Daniel Dennett, probably the world&#8217;s pre-eminent philosopher of mind, seems to think that free will is something that evolved, one of the things that gives humans their survival advantage over just about everything else on Earth. But on the other hand, our best guesses about how the mind works are that the mind is just what the brain does, and the brain is really just another biological machine, like everything else in our bodies, so its activities ought to be fully determined by physical factors: our immediately forthcoming thoughts and actions are just following on from the current physical state of our brain.</p>
<p>There are obviously issues to be resolved here. Now, I&#8217;m not a philosopher of mind, but it strikes me that there is something in my experience that isn&#8217;t adequately accounted for by a purely mechanistic theory of mind, as it stands, and that&#8217;s intention. Although I form habits by doing things, because doing things strengthens the neural pathways that facilitate their doing, my intention to form a habit (by making sure I write some of my thesis every day, for instance) can be effective. That is to say, if I <i>choose</i> to form a mental habit, I&#8217;m more likely to form it than if I didn&#8217;t bother with the discipline. Maybe this is all an illusion&#226;&#166;</p>
<p>But suppose I didn&#8217;t <i>believe</i> that it made any difference whether I intended to form a habit or not, that whether I finished my thesis or just slacked off until my scholarship ran out was already determined by the current state of my brain, which was in turn determined by my genetics, my upbringing, and so on. Then, if I was wrong, I would be likely just to leave everything up to my mechanistically determined destiny, and, failing to take action, I&#8217;d probably just slack off until my scholarship ran out.</p>
<p>This, I believe, is the kind of effect it has to teach people that they aren&#8217;t responsible for their actions. In short: they fail in life, and other people have to pick up the pieces of their shattered dreams. It&#8217;s lucky that most of us are impervious to &#8220;learning&#8221; that we aren&#8217;t responsible for what we do, and go on taking action regardless. Why do we do this? Because our experience tells us that it <i>does</i> make a difference what we intend.</p>
<p>Sure, in the absence of true scientific knowledge about whether free will exists or not, we can go on arguing about it. But in the absence of such knowledge, I&#8217;d say we ought to be pragmatic, and believe we are responsible for what we do. Because if we don&#8217;t, and we leave things to mechanistic destiny, we relinquish our ability to control our lives and achieve our goals. And that, I don&#8217;t need to tell you, would suck.</p>
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		<title>By: Ben Hourigan</title>
		<link>http://benhourigan.com/archives/2005/01/30/what-ive-learned-at-melbourne-uni/comment-page-1/#comment-7</link>
		<dc:creator>Ben Hourigan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Jan 2005 01:57:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benhourigan.com/?p=11#comment-7</guid>
		<description>I agree with you, Mel, that &quot;a pragmatic kind of relativism&quot; is valuable. Certainly, no-one is unbiased or infallible, and it is worth keeping an eye out for mistakes, distortions and lies motivated by a speaker or writer&#039;s implication in particular social contexts. And I&#039;ll also be one of the first people to argue that a good deal of what makes a person who they are is nurture, not nature: it&#039;s precisely that fact that makes humansâ¦ wellâ¦ human. 

But the fact is, there&#039;s a world out there, the qualities of which are largely independent of what you or I think they are (quantum uncertainty aside). When a thinker like Foucault, so beloved of our department, focuses on the way that knowledge is an effect of power, this tends to get ignored. The best way to investigate a piece of so-called &quot;knowledge&quot; is not to ask who put it forward, but to ask whether it is or is likely to be true. This means asking, of a statement or argument, things like:

* is it logical?
* do the conclusions follow from the evidence?
* when we test its claims against empirical observation, do they stand up?

not:

* what social class did the person who made the statement come from?
* what is their sexuality?
* what is their ethnicity?
* as what position in a chain of signifiers is their subjectivity articulated? &lt;i&gt;(Note: although this is a question Jacques Lacan, whom the department loves and I despise, might have asked, I find it so ridiculous as to consider my putting it in the list a gesture of irony.)&lt;/i&gt;


and so onâ¦ This last set naturally leads us into the logical fallacy of the &lt;i&gt;ad hominem&lt;/i&gt; argument (arguing for or against a position on the basis of its supporters&#039; personal qualities).

On another note, I think it&#039;s kind of sad that if, indeed, there is a continuum in the department, that I would be at one end and someone like, say, Audrey (as an example), would be at the other. Because that&#039;s actually a fairly narrow range of viewpoints. I personally would consider myself to be somewhere between Keith Windschuttle (on the issue of what intellectual traditions we ought to follow: I have no interest in what he has to say about Aborigines, and don&#039;t even know whether I&#039;d agree or disagree) and &quot;the department.&quot; But where are our Windschuttles or, on the issue of objectivity, our Ayn Rands? And where are our commie-hating, god-loving, Aristotle-reading conservatives? I disagree with many of the things that they might have to say, but our department is much poorer for our not having them around to argue with, and to ensure our students are exposed to a range of viewpoints.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree with you, Mel, that &#8220;a pragmatic kind of relativism&#8221; is valuable. Certainly, no-one is unbiased or infallible, and it is worth keeping an eye out for mistakes, distortions and lies motivated by a speaker or writer&#8217;s implication in particular social contexts. And I&#8217;ll also be one of the first people to argue that a good deal of what makes a person who they are is nurture, not nature: it&#8217;s precisely that fact that makes humans&#226;&#166; well&#226;&#166; human.</p>
<p>But the fact is, there&#8217;s a world out there, the qualities of which are largely independent of what you or I think they are (quantum uncertainty aside). When a thinker like Foucault, so beloved of our department, focuses on the way that knowledge is an effect of power, this tends to get ignored. The best way to investigate a piece of so-called &#8220;knowledge&#8221; is not to ask who put it forward, but to ask whether it is or is likely to be true. This means asking, of a statement or argument, things like:</p>
<ul>
<li>is it logical?</li>
<li>do the conclusions follow from the evidence?</li>
<li>when we test its claims against empirical observation, do they stand up?</li>
</ul>
<p>not:</p>
<ul>
<li>what social class did the person who made the statement come from?</li>
<li>what is their sexuality?</li>
<li>what is their ethnicity?</li>
<li>as what position in a chain of signifiers is their subjectivity articulated? <i>(Note: although this is a question Jacques Lacan, whom the department loves and I despise, might have asked, I find it so ridiculous as to consider my putting it in the list a gesture of irony.)</i></li>
</ul>
<p>and so on&#226;&#166; This last set naturally leads us into the logical fallacy of the <i>ad hominem</i> argument (arguing for or against a position on the basis of its supporters&#8217; personal qualities).</p>
<p>On another note, I think it&#8217;s kind of sad that if, indeed, there is a continuum in the department, that I would be at one end and someone like, say, Audrey (as an example), would be at the other. Because that&#8217;s actually a fairly narrow range of viewpoints. I personally would consider myself to be somewhere between Keith Windschuttle (on the issue of what intellectual traditions we ought to follow: I have no interest in what he has to say about Aborigines, and don&#8217;t even know whether I&#8217;d agree or disagree) and &#8220;the department.&#8221; But where are our Windschuttles or, on the issue of objectivity, our Ayn Rands? And where are our commie-hating, god-loving, Aristotle-reading conservatives? I disagree with many of the things that they might have to say, but our department is much poorer for our not having them around to argue with, and to ensure our students are exposed to a range of viewpoints.</p>
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		<title>By: Mel</title>
		<link>http://benhourigan.com/archives/2005/01/30/what-ive-learned-at-melbourne-uni/comment-page-1/#comment-6</link>
		<dc:creator>Mel</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Jan 2005 00:09:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://benhourigan.com/?p=11#comment-6</guid>
		<description>If there&#039;s a continuum with the department&#039;s attitude at one end and yours at the other, I think I&#039;d occupy a position somewhere in the middle. I agree with you that the insularity of the department creates a dogmatic style of thinking that abrogates intellectual responsibility. I also strongly oppose the reification of continental theory that I see in the department, and its shift away from being curious and omnivorous about culture (which I see as the primary role of a cultural studies department).

I also really hate the way a &#039;postmodern&#039; speaking position allows people to escape the moral and ethical dimensions of their own arguments, and lets people exist in a state of perpetual ironic detachment, never really &lt;i&gt;believing&lt;/i&gt; in anything.

But while I champion responsibility, I am suspicious of claims to objectivity, and I think that a pragmatic kind of relativism (perhaps &#039;skepticism&#039; would be a better word?) is valuable. I have found it useful to consider to what extent our subjectivities and actions are shaped by social forces larger than ourselves.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If there&#8217;s a continuum with the department&#8217;s attitude at one end and yours at the other, I think I&#8217;d occupy a position somewhere in the middle. I agree with you that the insularity of the department creates a dogmatic style of thinking that abrogates intellectual responsibility. I also strongly oppose the reification of continental theory that I see in the department, and its shift away from being curious and omnivorous about culture (which I see as the primary role of a cultural studies department).</p>
<p>I also really hate the way a &#8216;postmodern&#8217; speaking position allows people to escape the moral and ethical dimensions of their own arguments, and lets people exist in a state of perpetual ironic detachment, never really <i>believing</i> in anything.</p>
<p>But while I champion responsibility, I am suspicious of claims to objectivity, and I think that a pragmatic kind of relativism (perhaps &#8216;skepticism&#8217; would be a better word?) is valuable. I have found it useful to consider to what extent our subjectivities and actions are shaped by social forces larger than ourselves.</p>
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